Can Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment Help Us Distinguish Between True and False Confessions? by Kitai-Sangero, Rinat
Can Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment Help Us
Distinguish Between True and False Confessions?
Rinat Kitai-Sangero*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishmenti is a story about confessions.
Raskolnikov, who committed a double murder, and Nikolay, an innocent suspect,
each confess to the same crime. The novel illustrates two key aspects of a
confession. On the one hand, there is the urge of the offender to confess and the
curative effect of the confession. Being a means of healing and rehabilitation,
confession provides relief to the soul.2 Voluntary confession, according to the
traditional view, carries a great weight, as it emanates from the greatest sense of
guilt. Confession, being the recognition of one's sin, is also conceived as the
beginning of repentance. 4 The confessor approves through the confession that he
values the rule transgressed. 5  Given these aspects, it is not surprising that
confession has deep roots in religious beliefs.6 In the medieval era, confession was
conceived as a means of release from eternal hell. Even today, confession is
viewed as a necessary condition for divine pardon and the salvation of the soul.8
On the other hand, false confessions, especially during a custodial
interrogation, constitute a major source of miscarriage of justice. Raskolnikov,
talking about Nikolay's confession, thought that false confessions were
. Senior Lecturer, The Academic Center of Law and Business, Ramat Gan, Israel. I thank
Boaz Sangero, A.M. Goldstein and Alejandro A. Abreu for their helpful comments.
I FYODOR DosTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., Pocket
Books 2004) (1866).
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 538 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); Amy D. Ronner,
Dostoyevsky and the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 41, 46 (2006).
See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The
Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 871, 872 (2008).
4 See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1420 (1985); See
also Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan's Convictions: The Lay Judge System and the Rights of
Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1417, 1432 (2008) (stating that "the true
centerpiece of Japanese criminal justice is the confession, which is considered to be the first step in
rehabilitating the criminal and the beginning of the reintegration process").
Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 284
(1991).
6 See SUSAN M. LEVIN, THE ROMANTIC ART OF CONFESSION 2-3 (1998).
See Stefan Trechsel, Why Must Trials be Fair? 31 ISR. L. REv. 94, 99 (1997).
8 See Weiner et al., supra note 5, at 283.
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"something inexplicable, amazing-something beyond . . . understanding."9
Although there are no precise data on the occurrence of false confessions and
wrongful convictions caused by them, and although some scholars, chief among
them Paul Cassell, denigrate its prevalence and importance,'I the danger of false
confessions is well known today, thanks, in part, to the Innocence Project.12
In the famous Coffin ruling,'3 the United States Supreme Court mentioned an
ancient anecdote. According to the tale, a Roman governor was on trial before the
Emperor Julian. After hearing the accusations against him, the governor sufficed
with a denial of guilt, confident that the prosecutor had not presented sufficient
evidence to prove his guilt. Guessing the forthcoming failure of the accusation, the
prosecutor exclaimed: "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if [sic] it is sufficient to deny, what
hereafter will become of the guilty?" Emperor Julian's famous reply was, "If it
suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?"
Alexander Pushkin applied the same logic regarding confessions in his story,
The Captain's Daughter:
It was thought that the accused's own confession was essential for the
full exposure of his guilt, an idea not only without foundation but
positively contrary to common juridical sense: for if a denial by the
accused is not acceptable as proof of innocence, his confession is even
less a proof of guilt.14
9 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 416.
1o Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 431-32 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshel. Actually, the phenomenon cannot
currently be estimated empirically. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to
Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 559 (1998).
1 Cassell claims that false confessions as a cause of false convictions are rare. Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327, 328 (1998) [hereinafter Cassell I]; see also Paul G. Cassell, Protecting
the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-A nd from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 497, 502, 506-07 (1998) [hereinafter Cassell II] (discussing Miranda's negative effects
on obtaining confessions).
12 See ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 118 (1994); Steven A. Drizin & Richard
A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 920-921
(2004); Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 3, at 875-77; Major Peter Kageleiry, Jr., Psychological
Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudoscience in the Interrogation Room Obscures Justice in the
Courtroom, 193 MIL. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2007); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 10, at 430 (opining that
"[plolice elicit false confessions so frequently"); Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New
Justification for Demanding "Strong Corroboration" to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2791,
2791 (2007); Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 979, 983.
13 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455 (1895).
14 ALEXANDER PUSHKIN, The Captain's Daughter, in QUEEN OF SPADES AND OTHER STORIES
101, 146 (Andrew Kahn ed., Alan Myers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1836).
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In other words: an assumption according to which it is enough to confess in
order to be convicted, but not enough to deny (in the absence of evidence) in order
to be acquitted, may harm the innocent.
Despite Pushkin's logic, confession bears damaging consequences in the
normal case." We are more believable when telling bad things about ourselves
than good things. This common assumption, however, loses much of its validity
(if it has any, since there are persons who tend to belittle themselves) under
conditions of police interrogation.
An analysis of Raskolnikov's and Nikolay's separate confessions
demonstrates the complexity of the motives that drive people, the guilty and
innocent alike, to confess to a crime. This analysis points to the distinction
between true and false confessions. In general, the novel supports the conclusion
that the accused should be required to provide significant details of the crime as a
requirement for relying on that person's confession.
Part II of this paper describes the process that Raskolnikov, the actual
murderer, undergoes until his confession at the police station, and offers various
reasons for his decision to confess. This part is a literary (psychologically based)
analysis. Part III analyzes Nikolay's false confession, which was a custodial
confession, against the background of the police interrogation. Part IV examines
the suggestion to require corroboration as a condition for obtaining a conviction on
the basis of extrajudicial confession: the argument is advanced that, although
highly desirable, it is not enough to distinguish between true and false confessions.
Part V advises that significant knowledge of the facts of the crime should be a
necessary requirement for relying on extrajudicial confession. Confession that
does not demonstrate significant knowledge of the facts of the crime should not be
admitted as evidence.
I. RASKOLNIKOV'S CONFESSION
In the novel, Raskolnikov arrives at the police station and declares: "It was I
[who] killed the old pawnbroker woman and her sister Lizaveta with an axe and
robbed them." 16  From a legal point of view, his confession is undoubtedly
voluntary. What motivated Raskolnikov into making this confession, which is
likely to send him to a Siberian prison for many years?
Raskolnikov's confession actually manifested a peak of his inner struggle.
The inner torture that he experienced began soon after the thought of committing
the murder had taken hold. This internal struggle is waged between the
loathingthat Raskolnikov feels toward the very commission of the murder and his
15 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 266 (2008).
16 DOsTOYEVsKY, supra note 1, at 621 (emphasis omitted).
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ideas rearding the possible utility to the public at large ensuing from the
murder.
The murder, however, exacerbates Raskolnikov's torment. Immediately after
the event, he is torn between the desire to confess and turn himself in, on the one
hand, and the urge to survive, on the other. He fears confession and longs for it at
the same time. 18 In this regard, Raskolnikov may resemble other criminals. "It is
clear that in the criminal two mental forces are fighting for supremacy," Theodor
Reik believes. "One tries to wipe out all traces of the crime, the other proclaims
the deed and the doer to the whole world."1 9
Raskolnikov could easily have escaped punishment. Nobody had noticed him
near the scene of the crime. He murdered Lizaveta, the pawnbroker's sister, the
only eyewitness. Techniques of forensic science, such as fingerprinting, let alone
DNA, did not exist in the middle of the nineteenth century.20 Indeed, Raskolnikov
believes that the evidence that Porfiry, the examining magistrate, has against him is
enough only to arrest him but not to charge him and certainly not to convict him.
As he tells Sonia:
They've no real evidence. . . . All the facts they know can be explained
two ways, that's to say I can turn their accusations to my credit. . . . But
they will certainly arrest me. . . . But that's no matter, Sonia: they'll let
me out again . . . for there isn't any real proof against me, and there
won't be, I give you my word for it. And they can't convict a man on
what they have against me.21
Raskolnikov also takes steps to hide his crime. He washes the bloodstains
from his clothes and the murder weapon, the axe,22 which he returns to its former
place,23 and he hides the stolen goods in a safe place under a stone.24 He resists
Porfiry's implicit attempts to incriminate him. Thus, for example, when talking
about the article that Raskolnikov wrote, Porfiry guesses that perhaps Raskolnikov
deems himself one of those extraordinary persons who is entitled to commit
17 DoSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 9. In fact, the reasons that drove Raskolnikov to murder
are complex and not very clear. See GARY COX, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A MIND TO MURDER 42-43
(1990); Ronner, supra note 2, at 82-86.
1 Ronner, supra note 2, at 89.
19 THEODOR REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS: ON THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 49-50 (Grove Press 1961) (1959).
20 Dan E. Stigall, Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at "Consciousness of
Guilt " Evidence, 27 ARMY LAW. 54, 54 (2005).
21 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 492.
22 Id. at 98-99.
23 Id. at 106.
24 Id.at131.
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offenses under certain circumstances: "And, if so, could you bring yourself in case
of worldly difficulties and hardship or for some service to humanity-to overstep
obstacles? ... For instance, to rob and murder?" Raskolnikov replies defiantly
and contemptuously, "If I did I certainly should not tell you."25
At the same time, however, Raskolnikov plants evidence against himself
much before his confession. 26 We have many indications that he actually wants to
get caught, making unconscious efforts to fail. He begins his plan late because of
the deep sleep into which he had fallen,27 and he forgets to lock the victim's door
during the commission of the murder.28 Actually, Raskolnikov's habit of leaving
his door unlocked is an indication of an unconscious desire to confess his sin.29
Upon meeting Zematov, the head clerk of the police station, at a tavern,
Raskolnikov is on the verge of confessing and initiates a conversation about the
murder, saying among other things, "Perhaps I know more about it than you do." 30
Pointing to the newspapers around him, he talks like one who is being
interrogated:
I declare to you . .. no, better, 'I confess' . . . No, that's not right either;
'I make a deposition and you take it,' I depose that I was reading, that I
was looking and searching .... and came here on purpose to do it-for
news of the murder of the old pawnbroker woman.
Zematov, though suspicious, does not clearly understand: "What if you have
been reading about it? . . . What of it?"32
Raskolnikov continues to implicate himself: "The same old woman ... about
whom you were talking in the police-office, you remember, when I fainted. Well,
do you understand now?" 33 Zametov still cannot fully understand: "What do you
mean? Understand . . . what?" 34 But the idea crawls into his mind: "You are
either mad, or . . .," refusing to complete the idea.35 Raskolnikov carries on,
playing between confession and taunt. After describing how he would have misled
25 Id. at 312.
26 EDWARD WASIOLEK, DOSTOEVSKY: THE MAJOR FICTION 70-71 (1964); S.C. Burchell,
Dostoiefsky and the Sense of Guilt, 17 PSYCHOANALYTIC REv. 195, 202 (1930); Ronner, supra note 2,
at 87.
27 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 82-84.
28 Id at 99.
29 Cox, supra note 17, at 110.
30 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 190.
" Id. at 191.
32 Id. at 192.
33 id.
SId
34 id
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the interrogators after the event were he the murderer,36 he defiantly asks: "And
what if it was I who murdered the old woman and Lizaveta?" 37  Immediately
thereafter, he blames Zametov for believing such a possibility. Upon the latter's
denial, Raskolnikov urges him to think where the money in his hand and his new
clothes came from (we know they came from his mother).39 The conversation
attracts Zametov's suspicion, who then reports it to Porfiry.40
Moreover, Raskolnikov returns to the pawnbroker's flat after the murder.41 A
compulsive return to the scene of the crime is a recognized psychological
phenomenon.42 Raskolnikov, however, is not only drawn to come back, but he
betrays himself almost completely through his stran e behavior and conversation.
He tries to reconstruct his deed by ringing the bell. When a workman asks him
who he is, he answers, "You want to know? Come to the police station, I'll tell
you." He reveals his identity on this occasion to the porter and other
bystanders. 45
It is natural that we wish to confess our vulnerabilities and bad deeds to
someone close. It is hard to bear secrets. Closeness with others means allowing
them to get to know you.46 As Jung tells us, a person "does not feel himself
accepted unless the very worst in him is accepted too."A7 "The maintenance of
secrets acts like a psychic poison,"48 severing the possessor of the secret from his
fellow-beings.49  Raskolnikov breaks with his mother and sister. He avoids
touching even Dounia's hand, thinking that she would feel he had stolen her kiss if
she knew about the heinous murder. Not revealing the hidden parts of himself
separates Raskolnikov not only from his family but also from the rest of the world.
After the murder, Raskolnikov in fact feels "a mystical awareness of his
36 Id. at 195-96.
" Id. at 196.
38 id
' Id. at 197.
40 Id. at 300, 528.
41 Id. at 202-06.
42 REIK, supra note 19, at 55-61; Burchell, supra note 26, at 203.
43 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 204.
4 Id at 205.
45 Id at 206.
4 Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from
Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REv. 327, 363 (1998).
4 C.G. JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL 270 (W.S. Dell & Cary F. Baynes trans.,
1933).
48 Id. at 35.
49 Id. at 35-36.
so DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 497.
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estrangement from the human family."51 In such a situation, Jung relates, "[i]t is
only with the help of confession that I am able to throw myself into the arms of
humanity freed at last from the burden of moral exile."52 Therefore, in order to
maintain his being part of the world and to free himself of loneliness, Raskolnikov
confesses; first, indirectly through a enetrating look at his good friend,
Razumihin,5 3 and then explicitly to Sonia, 4 whom he hardly knew at the time, but
whose self-sacrifice, goodness, and purity he recognizes.
Although "[t]he immediate consequence of this encounter with moral-social
isolation, of his exile from the human community, is an overwhelming impulse to
confess to the humane police officer Nikodim Fomich,"55 it is far from obvious
that this natural connection between people who are close to each other may be
transferred to the interrogator at the police station. The interrogator may be
hostile, is hardly perceived as a friend, and is probably going to harm the
confessor. Moreover, at the time of his confession Raskolnikov has already
revealed his secret to Sonia and to Dounia and there was, no reason for him to
share his secret with police officers to overcome any sense of loneliness.
Why, then, does Raskolnikov decide to confess at the police station? It is not
clear. Raskolnikov himself does not completely understand why he decides to
confess. On the same day that he goes to the police station, he says to his sister
Dounia: "I am going at once to give myself up. But I don't know why. . . ."56 He
still insists that he actually committed no crime br killing the old pawnbroker, and
that his deed was justified on utilitarian grounds.
Despite these declarations to Dounia, we have indications that Raskolnikov
did repent his crime. One day after the murder, he views his deed as a "base,
filthy, degrading business."58  To Sonia, he exclaims: "Did I murder that old
woman? I murdered myself, not her! . . . [I]t was the devil that killed the old
woman, not I."59 On the way to making his confession at the 6,olice station, he
kneels down and kisses the earth, as Sonia ordered him to do. At the trial, he
claims that repentance was the reason for his confession.61
51 Konstantin Mochulsky, Crime and Punishment: A Novel Tragedy in Five Acts, in CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON DOSTOEVSKY 90, 95 (Robin Feuer Miller ed., 1986); see also JOSEPH FRANK,
DOSTOEVSKY: THE MIRACULOUS YEARS, 1865-1871 at 64 (1995).
52 JUNG, supra note 47, at 41.
5 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 369. He later decided he was mistaken. Id at 520.
54 Id at 479.
ss FRANK,supra note 51, at 114-15.
56 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 605.
17 Id at 605-06.
51 Id. at 132.
" Id at 489-90.
6 Id. at 614.
61 Id. at 625.
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Even if he did regret his crime, it is not clear whether Raskolnikov was
overwhelmed with pangs of conscience. We are told that he became ill in prison
because of his wounded pride and that, in fact, he did not actually repent his
crime. 62 On the contrary, he wishes he could have felt remorse: "Oh, how happy
he would have been if he could have blamed himself! . . . But he judged himself
severely, and his exasperated conscience found no particularly terrible fault in his
past. . . ."63 Raskolnikov admits at this stage to a mistake, not to a sin. 4  He
admits to himself the wrongness of his crime and his theory only after having a
65dream in the prison hospital about microbes that destroyed the world, and only
then is he able to achieve self-reconciliation.
Perhaps, even without full remorse, people just have a compulsion to confess.
Such a compulsion is a recognized phenomenon in psychological literature. 66
Through confession, the confessor wants to regain the love he lost. Even the
failing of talking too much involves the same compulsion. Given the fact that
people are used to confessing their vulnerabilities to friends and therapists, then
"[a] criminal confession is simply an extreme manifestation of normal behavior." 69
Moreover, some scholars suggest the possibility that Raskolnikov committed the
70
murder in order to confess, be punished, and repent. Indeed, according to
Freudian psychological theory, the unconscious feeling of guilt may bring about
the commission of a crime in order to connect the unfocused feeling to a real deed
and satisfy this feeling through punishment.7 1  We find support for this far-
reaching theory in Raskolnikov's anticipation of making a confession. The first
time in Sonia's flat, he says to her,
I know [who killed Lizaveta] and will tell . . . you, only you. I have
chosen you out. I'm not coming to you to ask forgiveness, but simply to
62 Id. at 633-34.
6 Id. at 633.
6 David Kiremidjian, Crime and Punishment: Matricide and the Woman Question, 33 AM.
IMAGO 403, 420 (1976).
65 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 638.
6 See REIK, supra note 19, at 180, 194.
67 REiK, supra note 19, at 208.
6 Id at 229.
69 Corey John Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis ofLegal
Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1121, 1177.
70 See WASIOLEK, supra note 26, at 75-76; see also Ronner, supra note 2, at 88.
71 14 SIGMUND FREUD, Criminals From a Sense of Guilt, in THE STANDARD EDION OF THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 332, 332 (James Strachey trans.) (1957). See also PETER
BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 74 (2000); REIK, supra
note 19, at 474; Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confessions in Law & Literature, 8 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 15 (1996) [hereinafter Storytelling]; Burchell, supra note 26, at 195, 201.
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tell you. I chose you out long ago to hear this, when your father talked of
you and when Lizaveta was alive, I thought of it.72
Moreover, we cannot deny the possibility that Raskolnikov killed to prove
unconsciously the fault of his theory and to restore the moral and religious values
that misguided reason had blinded him from recognizing. Whereas the rational
adult Raskolnikov justifies the murder of an old woman on utilitarian grounds, the
dream of a mare cruelly beaten to death exposed the young Raskolnikov to be a
child who was shocked by murder.73
We may think of many further possible reasons for Raskolnikov's decision to
confess, beyond repentance or anticipated repentance. Perhaps he did not want to
be viewed as timid by those who knew of his crime-Sonia, Dounia, Svidrigallov,
and Porfiry. When Porfiry teases Raskolnikov by asking him whether he was
afraid of bearing the consequences of confession, he says to him, "Why, is it the
bourgeois disgrace you are afraid of? . . . 'Ach, hang it!' Raskolnikov whispered
with loathing and contempt." 74
Perhaps Raskolnikov's confession was his way of becoming close to Sonia,
the woman he loves and trusts. Right after confessing to her, Raskolnikov asks
Sonia, "[W]hat am I to do now?" She answers resolutely, "Go at once, this very
minute, stand at the cross-roads, bow down, first kiss the earth which you have
defiled and then bow down to all the world and say to all men aloud, 'I am a
murderer!' Then God will send you life again." Rejecting the possibility at this
point, Raskolnikov tries to soften Sonia's message: "You mean Siberia, Sonia? I
must give myself up?" But she does not allow him to do so: "Suffer and expiate
your sin by it, that's what you must do." 76 Before going to the police station,
Raskolnikov is not able to see Sonia, since "[h]e was afraid of Sonia, too. Sonia
stood before him as an irrevocable sentence. He must go his own way or hers."77
Indeed, he goes to the police station to confess, but leaves it without confessing. 8
Then, seeing Sonia's "look of poignant agony, of despair, in her face," and further
realizing her disappointment, he returns and confesses his crime.7 9
The constant fear of getting caught may also have motivated Raskolnikov's
confession. He wonders whether the police already knew that he was the murderer
and what evidence Porfiry has against him.8 0 Thus, he is suddenly alarmed by the
72 DoSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 388.
7 FRANK, supra note 51, at 106.
74 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 536.
" Id. at 490.
76 Id.
7 Id at 540.
71 Id. at 616-20.
7 Id at 620.
s Id at 152.
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idea that he mistakenly left some of the victim's goods in his room and returns to
search it frantically-"his hair was soaked with sweat and he was breathing
heavily"-instead of dining, as planned, with his mother and sister.81 Porfiry's
description of his general tactics regarding certain suspects touches on
Raskolnikov's deepest fears: "If I leave one man quite alone ... but let him know
or at least suspect every moment that I know all about it and am watching him day
and night," Porfiry offers, "he'll be bound to lose his head .... Freedom will lose
its attractions."82 Raskolnikov is aware that a simple, unnoticed thing may expose
him, and that there is no perfect crime. At any moment, he expects to be
officially interrogated.84 How long could a person endure such a life?
And perhaps Raskolnikov's confession stemmed from a sense of failure,
despair, and confusion.8 5 He actually suggests this explanation to Dounia. 86 He
turns himself in because he feels weak and talentless. He recognizes his failure
to live according to his own ideals. His reactions to the murder and to the
investigation have demonstrated to him that he is not the strong, extraordinary
person he had imagined. In his condition, trapped in sickness, delusions, obsessive
thoughts, depression, isolation, and panic attacks, he can see no other way ahead of
him. Raskolnikov does not sacrifice his freedom because he has not enjoyed it
since the murder.
Sonia represents the good angel and the belief in God and Christ, whereas
Svidrigailov, the unscrupulous person who tries to sexually harass Dounia,
embodies the bad angel and the belief in self.89 Svidrigallov is the prototypical,
strong Napoleonic person who can overcome all moral obstacles without feelings
of guilt-in other words, the person Raskolnikov imagined himself to be before the
commission of the murder. Svidrigailov's way also contrasts with Porfiry's.
Both men tell Raskolnikov that he needs air. Svidrigailov makes this
recommendation: "[W]hat all men need is fresh air, fresh air . . . more than
anything!"9 ' The same day, after accusing Raskolnikov openly and urging him to
confess, Porfiry uses the same words: "What you need now is fresh air, fresh air,
8 Id. at 319.
82 Id. at 399-400.
8 Id. at 318, 322.
84 Id. at 171.
85 See Cox, supra note 17, at 125.
86 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 605-06.
87 LESLIE A. JOHNSON, THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME IN CRIMEANDPUNISHMENT49 (1984).
88 John Tasioulas, Repentance and the Liberal State, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 491 (2006).
89 See Mochulsky, supra note 51, at 92; WASIOLEK, supra note 26, at 80-81.
9 Napoleon symbolizes for Raskolnikov a great person who is ready to pay a huge cost in
terms of harm to others in order to fulfill his idea: DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 305-07, 484.
91 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 513.
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fresh air!" 92 Porfiry promises a renewed life after submitting to punishment.93
Svidrigailov suggests escaping to America. 94  But Svidrigailov's way leads to
suicide. He connects America and his approaching death in the conversation with
the soldier that occurs a moment before pulling the trigger of the revolver: "'I am
going to foreign parts, brother.' 'To foreign parts?' 'To America.' 'America?'
Svidrigailov took out the revolver and cocked it."95
What happened to Raskolnikov that made him leave the police station without
confessing upon hearing about Svidrigailov's suicide? Perhaps he realized that
death was an option for him, too. Perhaps Svidrigailov's suicide decreased
Raskolnikov's motivation to confess after the danger of blackmail and of revealing
his secret to the police had disappeared (Svidrigailov, who listened to
Raskolnikov's confession to Sonia behind the door, was the only person who
might betray Raskolnikov). The strongest point, however, is that Svidrigallov's
death symbolizes the death of his way. Only Sonia and her belief in God remain as
does Porfiry, Raskolnikov's accusing side.
Porfiry, the clever investigator, conveys to Raskolnikov the message that
Raskolnikov will eventually break down under the storm of his own feelings. Not
a typical interrogator, Porfiry is not only very intelligent, but also endowed with a
deep psychological understanding of a human being's soul. 96 He actually respects
Raskolnikov with all his complex characteristics as a human being. In their third
encounter, he is honest with Raskolnikov, to whom he speaks openly and
candidly.98 After Raskolnikov asks Porfiry, "[t]hen . . . who then . . . is the
murderer?" 99 With genuine conviction, Porfiry answers in words reminiscent of
those exclaimed by the Prophet Nathan to King David: "That man is you!" 00
Porfiry answers: "Why, you, Rodion Romanovitch! You are the murderer .. .".,0
Porfiry urges Raskolnikov to "surrender and confess," telling him that his
confession would be to both their advantages 0 2 and promising that the sentence
92 Id. at 537.
9 Id. at 535-36.
94 Id. at 566.
9s Id. at 597.
96 See Ronner, supra note 2, at 90.
9 See FRANK, supra note 51, at 138; see also Ronner, supra note 2, at 101. We should also
recall that Porfiry respected his word and did not reveal the suspicions he had against Raskolnikov.
DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 625. There are scholars who see Porfiry's character differently and
criticize him for his "sadism." JOHNSON, supra note 87, at 91.
98 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 524, 526.
SId. at 532.
102 Samuel 12:7.
101 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 532.
02 Id. at 534.
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would be reduced in exchange for a confession.10 3 Porfiry expresses belief in
Raskolnikov's ability to be regenerated and to have a promising future after the
release from prison.104  At the same time, however, he makes it clear that
Raskolnikov will not escape: "'Your lip,' he told him, 'is twitching just as it did
before. Porfiry tries his best not to coerce Raskolnikov, but to convince him
that confession is the morally correct act. He does not place Raskolnikov under
arrest immediately after accusing him of the murder; rather, he leaves Raskolnikov
with enough leeway to make this crucial decision-which Porfiry knew he would
make.106
All of the possible reasons that I have mentioned for Raskolnikov's
confession may fuse together to present a process of coping with the crime and his
reactions to it. And, indeed, Raskolnikov stood behind his confession and pled
guilty at the trial.107
We will turn now to an analysis of Nikolay's confession.
III. NIKOLAY'S CONFESSION
Nikolay was the immediate suspect. He was at the scene of the crime because
he worked as a painter on the second floor of the building where it was committed
(the murder took place on the fourth floor). He did not show up for work on the
day after the murder (probably because he had been drinking heavily).los
Immediately after the murder, he sold a piece of jewelry that had belonged to the
murder victim that had been stolen during the commission of the murder.109 (We
actually know that Raskolnikov accidentally dropped it while hiding in the empty
second-floor flat.110) Nikolay, furthermore, lied to the buyer, telling him that he
had found the jewel on the street.111 When the buyer told him about the murder,
Nikolay tried to commit suicide.12
Why did Nikolay confess to a murder of which he was innocent? Since the
story does not focus on the investigation of the crime, but rather on its
psychological effects, we do not know the exact reason for his false confession.
103 Id. at 535.
104 Id. at 535-36.
05 Id at 532.
106 Ronner, supra note 2, at I10.
107 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 623.
los Id. at 163.
109 Id at 162.
110 Id. at 104-05. See id at 165-66, for Nikolay's initial story.
't' Id. at 162.
112 Id. at 164.
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We may guess, however, that Nikolay's confession has emanated from a
combination of two reasons.
Porfiry believes that Nikolay confessed to purify himself of some general
guilt, and that he wanted to accept agony upon himself, since he recalled his
religious studies.1 3 Nikolay, though, was not depressed. He had been playing
like a child with another painter at the time of the murder: they were running after
each other, laughing, and hitting each other in a friendly way.114 Porfiry himself
describes Nikolay as a person who "sings and dances, he tells stories, they say, so
that people come from other villages to hear him."
115
It is more plausible that the central explanation for Nikolay's confession is
reflected in Raskolnikov's words to Porfiry after Nikolay had made a confession:
[Y]our office is such a comical one . . . how you must have been
torturing . . . that poor Nikolay psychologically .. . till he confessed!
You must have been at him day and night, proving to him that he was the
murderer, and now that he has confessed, you'll begin vivisecting him
again. 'You are lying,' you'll say. 'You are not the murderer!' . . . You
must admit it's a comical business!11 6
And, indeed, although there are various reasons for this behavior, "making a
false confession is largely associated with police pressure. . . ."117
Confessions play a central role in the criminal process. The police
interrogation is actually designed to elicit confessions from suspects.118 After all,
persuading suspects to confess is a cheap and fast way to solve crimes. As Stephen
put it, "it is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a
poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence." Indeed,
police interrogations quite often succeed in producing confessions.120
Some scholars treat confessions suspiciously, opining that a rational person
would not confess unless under pressure. Grave doubts have been expressed as
" Id at 530-31.
114 Id at 165-66.
"s Id. at 530.
116 Id. at 415.
117 GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK 210 (2003).
118 See Sangero, supra note 12, at 2815.
" Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 17 (1910) (citing 1
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 441 (1883)).
120 Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Detention for the Purpose of Interrogation as Modern "Torture," 85
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 137, 138 (2008).
"' Id. at 148.
2011] 243
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIANAL LAW
to whether repentance underlay confession,122 and why was it that accused persons
against whom the evidence was weak were flooded with feelings of remorse.123
Most confessions, like Nikolay's, are obtained during interrogation.124 The
psychological phenomenon of confession cannot, therefore, be detached from the
process by which it is obtained.125 Interrogation manuals shed light on this
process. These manuals conclude that an accused person will not confess out of
shame and that his fear of confessing should be overcome.126 The interrogator
must convince the accused that confession is rational and desirable.127 To achieve
this goal, various tactics must be employed, 12 such as suffocating the accused
person's denials, 129 pretending to gain overwhelming evidence against the one
being interrogated, 130 faking sympathy and understanding for the crime,'31 and
trying to blur the adversary nature of the interrogation.132 These tactics, however,
though "[i]ntended for the guilty ... are psychologically powerful enough to elicit
confessions from the innocent."133
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court described in Miranda v.
Arizona the environment in which custodial interrogation generally takes place.134
It showed how custodial interrogation in itself operates to undermine an accused
person's will to resist.135 Detention isolates the accused from family, friends, and
place of work, detaches her from daily activities, and causes a suspect to lose
control of one's life.136  This isolation helps the interrogators to elicit
confessions.137 Moreover, most people have a tendency to obey the demands of
122 DAVID WOLCHOVER & ANTHONY HEATON-ARMSTRONG, WOLCHOVER AND HEATON-
ARMSTRONG ON CONFESSION EVIDENCE 11 (1996).
123 Id. at 13.
124 Id. at 65.
125 id
126 Id at 66; see GUDJONSSON, supra note 117, at 10-11.
12' Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and
Irrational Action, 74 DENV. L. REv. 979, 985 (1997).
128 GUDJONSSON, supra note 117, at 10-13.
129 LEO, supra note 15, at 136-138.
13o Id. at 139-140.
131 WOLCHOVER & HEATON-ARMSTRONG, supra note 122, at 70; Deborah Young, Unnecessary
Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 430-31 (1996).
132 Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1019 (2001).
13 Drizin & Leo, supra note 12, at 918.
134 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450-55 (1966).
.3s Id. at 455, 457, 465.
136 Kitai-Sangero, supra note 120, at 139.
137 Wayne T. Westling, Something Is Rotten In the Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video
Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537, 537 (2001).
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persons of authority. This tendency is exacerbated under conditions of custodial
interrogation, which creates a psychological reality in which the accused person
conceives herself to be, like a slave, in a position of "submission to authority." 39
This submission seriously violates the accused person's ability to make rational
decisions.140 Actually, detention itself may lead normal persons into pathological
situations.141 It is no wonder that employing psychological tactics aiming to break
an accused person's resistance falls on fertile ground in circumstances of custodial
interrogation.
Given the circumstances of custodial interrogation, we may guess how
Nikolay's interrogators drove him to make a confession. Did they show
confidence in his guilt? Did they rule out as nonsense every explanation that he
offered and make him believe that there was no point in maintaining his
innocence? Did they shatter his confidence and undermine his reliability after
catching him in an overt lie? When Nikolay was asked why he was playing with
the other painter immediately after the murder, he replied that he did it to distract
people from his deed. Porfiry, convinced of Nikolay's innocence, mutters when
hearing this explanation, "It's not his own tale he is telling."'14 2  Porfiry's
disappointment notwithstanding, "[he] would not have had to look far to put the
blame, for it was surely the prospect of the investigation, Porfiry's own area of
expertise, which drove Mikolaj [Nikolay] to despair.",143  It is only logical to
assume that the interrogators, probably guided by Porfiry, blamed Nikolay to
distraction, and he mechanically reiterated what they said, becoming confused and
desperate when he realized what appeared to be the strength of the case against
him. Nikolay was not a strong person. His initial reaction to the accusations was
an attempt to commit suicide rather than to defy them. He probably belongs to the
category of false confessors who try to avoid confrontation and to appease others,
especially persons of authority.1" We should also recall that the likelihood of
obtaining a confession increases the longer the interrogation lasts,145 and that the
138 Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 241-
42. For an instructive example, see BROOKS, supra note 71, at 151.
139 Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 How. L.J.
31, 50 (2005).
140 Id. at 50-51.
141 Ayling, supra note 69, at 1164-66.
142 DoSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 413.
143 JOHNSON, supra note 87, at 87.
1" For this kind of false confessor, see Hirsch, supra note 139, at 53.
145 Richard Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 292
(1996).
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police tend to exert more pressure to obtain a confession in cases of a serious
offense like murder. 146
Nikolay's initial denial of guiltl47 demonstrates that self-destruction was not
his motive for confessing. Nevertheless, to the pressures of custodial interrogation
we may add the influence of feelings of a general and unfocused or "free-floating"
guilt. Philosophers described this feeling:
Then who could ever be confident that sometime, somewhere, somehow
he did not commit some species of crime? Each of us would probably be
guilty in one particular or another; and since we could never certainly
know the limits of our particular guilts-it may have been some
indiscreet phrase or euivocal intonation-we must all experience the
state of general guilt.
After all, "[w]e violate justice continuously in myriads of ways personally and
socially. Or, put slightly differently, we are constantly offending others and
distorting human relations among us. Human beings are continuously in need of
redemption, forgiveness, and restoration."l49 So even if we do not follow Freud's
thesis, according to which "this obscure sense of guilt [is] derived from the
Oedipus complex and was a reaction to the two great criminal intentions of killing
the father and having sexual relations with the mother,"150 we may agree that
everyone is surely guilty of something. We may also feel guilt because we do not
fulfill ourselves in the way we dreamed, or because we broke up with certain
persons. This sense of guilt may reflect a failure of the "realization of self."15 1
The feeling of general, unfocused guilt may cause individuals to confess falsely
out of an unconscious need for punishment or for redemption through submitting
to suffering.152 Is it not true, as Cox assumes, that "we, too, as readers, have
become accessories to the crime by our identification with Raskolnikov"?153 Why
do we not feel pity for the old pawnbroker upon reading the description of the
murder?
'6 White, supra note 12, at 990.
147 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 165.
148 EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 154 (1949). Of generalized guilt and the need
for punishment, see GuDJONssON, supra note 117, at 195; see also 0. JOHN ROGGE, WHY MEN
CONFESS 210-22 (1959).
149 Stanley S. Harakas, Forgiveness and Reconciliation: An Orthodox Perspective, in
FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION 51, 70 (Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., & Rodney L. Petersen eds.,
2001).
1so FREUD, supra note 71, at 332-33.
151 MARTIN BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 125 (1965) (quoting Carl Jung, Von der Wurzeln
des Bewusstseins, in PHSYCHOLOGISCHE ABHANDLUGEN IX (Rascher ed., 1954)).
152 Ayling, supra note 69, at 1157-61.
153 Cox, supra note 17, at 71.
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Nikolay may be viewed as a double or emanation of Raskolnikov. As Porfiry
said about Nikolay, "on iz raskolnikov," which translated into English means "he
is one of the schismatics."1 54 Nikolay also symbolizes that part of Raskolnikov
that wishes to confess, but in that sense everyone carries Nikolay within himself.
Everyone has the urge to confess one's sins, which may bring about a false
confession from the innocent. This urge is exacerbated under the pressure of
isolation. Rogge assures us that
[i]f there is superimposed on this desolation from incarceration
incommunicado the authority of a powerful totalitarian state and
protracted questioning, usually without sufficient sleep and often at
night, the primitive parts of one's mind will almost always without more
pressure do the rest of the work for the examining authorities: one's guilt
feelings, one's fear of the loss of love, the most painful feeling in the
world, and of retaliation and punishment will make almost every human
being confess to almost anything.155
The pressure of custodial interrogation and the feeling of general guilt may join
together to break down the accused person's will, who will then tell the
interrogators what they want to hear.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF CORROBORATION
Raskolnikov's confession saves Nikolay from wrongful conviction. Cassell
emphasizes that the ability to extract real confessions from guilty persons is the
main cause of obviating the wrong conviction of the innocent.156 Luckily, Porfiry
was not a ty ical interrogator. He did not close the case after obtaining Nikolay's
confession. Nevertheless, we must wonder whether Porfiry would have
continued the criminal proceedings against Nikolay had Raskolnikov declined
Porfiry's invitation to confess. It is very possible that the answer is positive, since
Porfiry did not release Nikolay from detention despite being convinced of his
innocence. In the first encounter between Porfiry and Raskolnikov, Porfiry says to
Razumihin, Raskolnikov's friend: "'[Y]ou were talking my ears off about that
154 GARY Cox, TYRANT AND VICTIM IN DOSTOEVSKY 83 (1984). See also Cox, supra note 17,
at 90.
1ss ROGGE, supra note 148, at 242-43.
156 Cassell II, supra note i1, at 502. For true voluntary confessions that saved the innocent,
see REIK, supra note 19, at 127-29; Daina Borteck, Note, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers
Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty,
25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1429, 1443, 1448-49 (2004); White, supra note 12, at 1010.
157 As interrogators often do. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 10, at 440. For the reasons that
interrogators cease an investigation when the suspect confesses, see Sangero, supra note 12, at 2815-
16.
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Nikolay... of course, I know, I know very well,' he turned to Raskolnikov, 'that
the fellow is innocent, but what is one to do?"",158 In light of the great probative
value ascribed to confessions, it is very tempting to continue the proceedings
against a person who accepts responsibility for a crime.
Without Raskolnikov's confession, Nikolay's wrongful conviction could
probably not have been prevented under the current legal system, which does not
place significant obstacles in the way of confession-based convictions. Most
jurisdictions require corroboration-i.e., proof independent of the confession-in
regard to establishing the corpus delicti of the offense, but not the identity of the
defendant as perpetrator of the crime. 159 In federal courts, the "Trustworthiness
Doctrine," requiring that a confession should be corroborated by substantial
independent evidence, has been adopted.160 In England, the defendant's
extrajudicial confession needs no corroboration and may be sufficient for
conviction. 16 Some scholars oppose the corroboration requirement, treating it as a
"technical obstruction[ ] to the administration of justice."162 Others claim that full
corroboration, or "strong corroboration" as Boaz Sangero terms it-meaning
"objective, tangible, and significant evidence" that encompasses both the very
commission of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator-is necessary in order
to prevent unreliable confessions. 63
Indeed, a confession should be corroborated, since it is incapable on its own
of distinguishing sufficiently between guilt and innocence.'" The stress, fear, and
anger that an innocent person experiences during a police interrogation might
make him or her act like a guilty person who tries to deceive the interrogators.165
Police interrogators are not "human lie detectors." 66 The United States Supreme
Court recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between true and false
confessions when it held that "though a statement may not be 'involuntary' within
the meaning of this exclusionary rule, still its reliability may be suspect if it is
extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police investigation-whose
words may reflect the strain and confusion attending his predicament rather than a
158 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 313-14.
159 Opper v. United States, 384 U.S. 84, 93 (1954); Sangero, supra note 12, at 2803; Fisher &
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 3, at 885-86. In offenses with no tangible corpus delicti, the corroboration
must implicate the accused. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154 (1954).
160 Sangero, supra note 12, at 2805; Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 3, at 886.
161 GuDJoNssoN, supra note 117, at 130; Sangero, supra note 12, at 2806-11.
162 B. Don Taylor III, Evidence Beyond the Confession: Abolish Arizona's Corpus Delicti
Rule, 41 ARIZ. Arr'Y 22, 23 (2005).
163 Sangero, supra note 12, at 2791. See also LEO, supra note 15, at 284-85.
164 Sangero, supra note 12, at 2820.
165 GUDJONSSON, supra note 117, at 25-28; Danny Cirac6, Reverse Engineering, 11 WINDSOR
REv. LEGAL & Soc. IssuEs 41, 51-52 (2001); Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception,
and Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 809, 812 (2002).
166 LEO, supra note 15, at 226; Kassin, supra note 165, at 809.
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clear reflection of his past."167 Under the Miranda safeguards, and in a situation of
the proper conduct of the interrogation, we assume the voluntariness of a
confession of guilt, while ignoring the inherent compulsion of custodial
-168interrogation.
Another reason that corroboration is required is that a feeling of general guilt
may induce an innocent person to give a false confession that imitates a true
confession. Nikolay gives "very plausible answers on certain points."' 69  His
confession seems to be true. Kneeling down, he declares before Porfiry: "I am
guilty! Mine is the sin! I am the murderer. . . .,,170 The requirement of
corroboration will discourage interrogators from focusing on obtaining confessions
instead of gathering extrinsic evidence to establish the truth. Focusing on
extrinsic evidence will help in the long run, as the Supreme Court emphasized in
Escobedo v. Illinois, to make the criminal justice system more reliable. Even if
it is impossible to conduct a more thorough investigation and gather more evidence
in a specific case,173 we should ask ourselves, as Pushkin asked in The Captain's
Daughter, why confession to the police is trusted, but not denial in the court, when
a defendant recants an extrajudicial confession and declares it unreliable. At least,
we should adopt Leo and Ofshe's suggestion to treat confessions as neutral
statements regarding guilt or innocence before their fit to the facts of the crime is
scrutinized.174
However, even a requirement of corroboration is insufficient to protect the
innocent who confess from wrongful conviction, for a false confession could be
corroborated with the same elements that evoked suspicion against the accused in
the first place. In Nikolay's case, there indeed was strong corroboration-the
jewelry of the murder victim that came into his possession without a credible
explanation. In such a case, a wrongful conviction might be avoided only if
significant knowledge of the facts of the crime was required in order to rely on a
confession.
167 Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
168 Kitai-Sangero, supra note 120, at 147-52.
169 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 529.
"7 Id. at 412.
' WOLCHOVER & HEATON-ARMSTRONG, supra note 122, at 29; Sangero, supra note 12, at
2817-18.
172 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) ("[A] system of criminal law
enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and
more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation.").
173 As in some cases of infanticide: Taylor, supra note 162, at 26; or in offenses that require
special intent in relation to this element: Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 3, at 902.
174 LEO, supra note 15, at 307; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 127, at 991.
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V. SIGNIFICANT KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE CRIME
Porfiry was certain that Nikolay, despite his confession, was not the murderer,
since his answers did not reveal good knowledge of the details of the murder. As
Porfiry said: "He answered me very plausibly on some points . . . But on other
points he . . . simply . . . knows nothing and doesn't even suspect that he doesn't
know!"17 5  Raskolnikov knew the location of the stolen goods taken from the
crime scene,176 whereas Nikolay did not know this. Raskolnikov was also able to
repeat the conversation that took place outside the victim's flat between the two
people who had come to visit the victim and found her flat locked.' 77
Leo and Ofshe suggest that a confession be regarded as reliable only if it fits
"the facts of the crime to a reasonable degree." Only the real perpetrator of the
crime possesses such knowledge in the ordinary case.179 In contrast, "[i]nnocent
false confessors are often most ignorant of many of the crime scene details, making
their post admission narratives replete with errors." 80  If the "significant
knowledge of the facts of the crime" suggestion is adopted, it would prevent
reliance on a confession, like Nikolay's, that does not produce the whereabouts of
the stolen goods, and does not demonstrate knowledge of basic facts regarding the
occurrence of the crime.
On the other hand, there are difficulties that inhere in the suggestion that the
law condition reliance on confessions upon their fitting closely with the facts of the
crime. As Paul Cassell notes, 181 a true confession may also deviate from or lack
all aspects of the actual event. Thus, Raskolnikov-the true murderer-did not
remember "what the trinkets were like, or even how many there were."182 We
know, of course, the reason for this lack of knowledge: Raskolnikov had
abandoned the goods and lost all interest in them following the murder.
Paul Cassell additionally notes that a fitness requirement goes beyond the
traditional tests of voluntariness.183  Besides, it can be applied only to full
175 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 531.
" Id at 624.
177 Id.
178 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 10, at 438-39; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the
Forest for the Trees: A Response to Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession
Problem, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 1135, 1142 (1997). See also LEO, supra note 15, at 286-87; Ayling,
supra note 69, at 1191; Drizin & Leo, supra note 12, at 1003.
179 LEO, supra note 15, at 286-87.
180 Id. at 289.
181 Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of
Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 593 (1999).
182 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 624.
183 Cassell, supra note 181, at 591.
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confessions rather than to incriminating statements.184 Thus, for example, if an
accused person is deceived into making incriminating statements, such as during a
conversation with an undercover agent, or if this person's conversations with an
accomplice are monitored, the accused person only naturally may refuse to provide
more details to the interrogators.
Even regarding full and conscious confessions, there may be holes in the
confession in comparison to the actual event. There are various reasons for this
gap. They may reflect an attempt to decrease the degree of one's guilt-for
example, a criminal who confesses to murder may deny the rape that occurred
before its -or it may involve problems of memory.186 Memory problems may
emanate from drunkenness or simply because we do not absorb every detail of our
deeds or habitually do not notice certain elements, such as the clothes someone is
weanng.
Furthermore, even a person who voluntarily confesses to a crime still has the
urge for survival, which may cause him to play with the police in a game of
confession and withdrawal, or the confessor may simply regret the confession and
decline to cooperate further. This latter possibility should be taken into account in
view of the conception that a criminal does have an urge to confess in order to be
relieved of the burden of hiding an awful secret, even if a complete repentance is
not felt, as perhaps was Raskolnikov's condition at the point of his confession.
Perhaps the confessor has not yet fully undergone the process experienced by this
Dostoyevsky character-a process that was not complete even at the point of his
confession at the police station-and is at the stage in which Raskolnikov found
himself when playing with Zametov in the tavern, where his words oscillated
between confession and provocation.
The accused person's feeling that only confession can bring the intensive
interro ation to a halt may cause the innocent and guilty alike to stop denying their
guilt. When a confession arises from the desire to cease the interrogation, the
human survival urge may make the guilty person lie or conceal the complete
details of the crime. Additionally, there may be bizarre explanations for not
disclosing details, such as the refusal to reveal where the body of the victim is
hidden as a manifestation of the murderer's revenge against the deceased person
and the latter's family. It may be that a third party found stolen goods and
removed them from their hiding place. Or the offender himself may simply want
to maintain possession of the stolen goods after being released from prison. At any
rate, a good explanation for the confessor's inability to provide details must be
found. Indeed, such an explanation was found for Raskolnikov: "Finally some of
the lawyers more versed in psychology admitted that it was possible he had really
134 Id. at 591-92.
"' Id. at 592-93.
116 Id. at 594-95. On shame that prevents a full confession, see Leo & Ofshe, supra note 10, at
440.
187 Storytelling,supra note 71, at 2-5; White, supra note 12, at 1019-21.
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not looked into the purse, and so didn't know what was in it when he hid it under
the stone."'88 Still, we may accept that the real culprit in a normal case would be
capable of providing significant details about the event, or, alternatively, would be
able to explain why he could not provide full details of the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
A person's mind is a complex piece of machinery. People want to portray
themselves well but also have a compulsion to admit guilt. Dostoyevsky's story
teaches us that innocent and guilty persons alike may confess to a crime and that
the accused person's motives for confessing are not very clear; indeed, they are
quite complicated. The feeling of general and unfocused guilt may induce a person
to seek punishment through the commission of a crime, but it may also impel
innocent persons to seek punishment through a confession.
There might be plausible reasons why a suspect who confessed to an
accusation would not validate that confession through external, independent
evidence, and would not provide significant details of the crime. Nevertheless, a
confession that does not demonstrate good knowledge of the facts of the crime
should normally be treated with suspicion as to its reliability and voluntariness.
Such a confession is evidence that the confessor is not ready to accept
responsibility for the crime. Under such circumstances, there is substantial danger
that the motive that drove one to confess is extraneous to the actual truth or to the
confessor's free will.
Normally, when a suspect reaches the point at which he or she is willing to
take responsibility for the crime that was committed, it is difficult to understand
why that person would admit to the crime but refuse to reveal the location of, say,
the body or the stolen goods. 189  As Crime and Punishment teaches us, a
willingness to take responsibility is the outcome of a mental process that the
criminal undergoes. An accused person who translates this willingness to take
responsibility into a confession is normally supposed to cooperate fully with the
police. The analyses of Raskolnikov's and Nikolay's separate confessions in the
novel support the conclusion that providing significant details of the crime should
be a condition for relying on a confession.
The requirement of close consistency between the confession and the facts of
the crime, however, will not save those who take responsibility for a crime they did
not commit out of a desire to cover up the guilt of another personl90 or protect a
person who confesses to a more serious offense (in terms of the mental element
that is required), such as murder instead of negligent homicide. In certain cases,
188 DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 624.
189 See also Sangero, supra note 12, at 2822 (regarding the corroboration requirement).
190 GUDJONSSON, supra note 117, at 210; Taylor III, supra note 162, at 24.
19" Ayling, supra note 69, at 1188 (regarding the corroboration requirement).
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the innocent person may be completely familiar with the details of the crime.
Moreover, there is substantial danger that the suspect's knowledge of the details of
the crime may be contaminated by facts fed to him by the police.192 A video
recording that removes the secrecy surrounding police interrogations and helps to
resolve factual controversies regarding the details of the interrogation, as well as
the mandatory presence of counsel,194 may assure a greater degree of certainty that
the suspect does not confess because of undue external pressures. Providing
significant details regarding the commission of the crime is, therefore, not at all the
end of the road to protecting innocent suspects from making false confessions. But
it is a necessary beginning.
Trying to limit reliance on confessions reflects, of course, a value-based
attitude toward confessions. Custodial interrogations inhere with a paradox: An
extrajudicial confession should be voluntary in order to be admissible, but
interrogations succeed precisely because they aim at persuading the accused person
that she has no choice except to confess.' 95 Crime and Punishment teaches us that
if we truly want to be faithful to the requirements of voluntariness and reliability,
then only a confession that reveals significant knowledge of the facts of the crime
may testify to the real offender and to the fact that this person is willing to accept
responsibility for the crime.
192 For this common danger, see LEO, supra note 15, at 169-73, 254-63. For more concrete
examples of this danger, see Ronald J. Rychlak, Interrogating Terrorists: From Miranda Warnings to
"Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, " 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 451, 463 (2007) (regarding Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)); White, supra note 12, at 983, 996, 999-1000, 1010. Indeed, as
Ayling, supra note 69, at 1187, put it: "In many ways, the police are coauthors of the confession: they
suggest-consciously or unconsciously-facts and story lines to the suspect. . . ."
193 There is wide consensus among scholars regarding the desirability of video recording of
interrogations. Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future, 36 Hous. L.
REv. 1251, 1305-06 (1999).
194 For such a proposal, see Anne Elizabeth Link, Supreme Court Review: Fifth Amendment-
The Constitutionality of Custodial Confessions, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878, 891, 898-900
(1992); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1830, 1842 (1987).
195 BROOKS, supra note 71, at 85; Mark A. Godsey, Shining the Bright Light on Police
Interrogation in America, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 711, 712 (2009).
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